The DRC made the headlines at the end of last year for electoral malpractice and violence and was treated with weary cynicism by the majority of newspapers. Joseph Kabila had as predicted been returned to the presidency, a position he had held since the assassination of his father during the brutal 2nd Congo War (1998-2003). Kabila had been faced by a divided opposition, hamstrung by internal divisions and tenuously lead by Etienne Tshisekedi. Yet this was an election which, rather than providing closure, through open the question of legitimacy in the Congo. Tshisekedi rejected the result and declared himself President, calling for mass strikes which have yet to materialise. The election posed multiple questions for Congo and by extension central Africa as a whole.

How corrupt were the elections but more importantly how have they been perceived by Congelese?

The questions all actors in the Congo are asking revolve around whether the elections can be viewed as credible. Evidence of electoral malpractice is certainly considerable: an estimated 3 – 4000 polling stations' ballots often from Tshisekedi strongholds were lost, there were improbably high turnouts of 100% in Kabila strongholds, and even more improbable 100% voter registration increases in the same districts. Yet, it is important to note that to overturn the result of elections a swing of 1.6 million votes would have been required from Kabila to Tshisekedi, far greater than the total number of “lost ballots”. Kabila defended the elections, pointing to high numbers of voters choosing to vote “Par Derogation”, outside their place of registration, as a possible cause of very high turnouts in some districts.

More important is how the elections were percieved by Congolese. The mood in the opposition and in Kinshasa was one of profound negativity and rejection, while many areas of the country remained calm, including, surprisingly, the anti–Kabila and profoundly unstable North and South Kivus. This split in the Congo is mirrored in the donor community; the Carter Centre in USA, the EU, France and Germany all condemned the elections, while Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa expressed support for the government or at least held back from outright condemnation.

The elections were undoubtedly corrupt, but it is uncertain whether the scale of corruption had a bearing on the eventual result. Consequently, perception of the election is crucially divided between those who cannot afford to accept it and those who cannot afford to reject it, making conflict apparently likely.

Can Kabila hold on in the face of opposition?

While 24 people were recorded as killed in election-related violence after the polling, there was relative calm as planned protests failed to materialise. In addition, the Kivus have remained comparatively quiet. Opposition protests in key towns such as Goma and Bukavu were limited in scope and size. Tshisekedi’s efforts to stage a rival presidential swearing-in were easily disbanded by the police using tear gas. Similarly, Kabila’s strong control of police and security forces within Kinshasha effectively limited the duration of unrest, both removing Tshisekedi’s support on the street and reducing the Congo’s “newsworthiness” in the international arena.

Kabila’s management of the external crisis was similarly adept. Rather than deny the scale of fraud, the government tended to focus on the scale of Kabila’s victory relative to the scale of alleged corruption. In the words of Kabila, “we wanted to organise perfect elections, did we attain that perfection? Not 100%...like in any other election, on the continent or otherwise”. This response may well prove placatory for donors, who are keen for a legislative solution. He has also been careful to point out the limited scope of NGO coverage in electoral observation.

On balance, it seems unlikely at the present time that Kabila will be forced out, either by internal or external pressure as a direct consequence of the election. Yet, it is also telling that he has made no moves to arrest Tshisekedi, who has openly declared himself president. This suggests that Kabila’s control may not be as cast iron as it looks.

What function has the election served?

This question has a more general applicability. Regardless of political persuasion, it would be easy to argue that the election failed in its pivotal role; providing clear and legitimate leadership. More than anything else, the election served to muddy the waters of Congo’s already confused political situation. Externally the vastly negative media coverage has reduced international confidence in the Congo.

Some commentators would argue the election was flawed from the start. In the confused, ethnically charged post–conflict society of the DRC, arguably the best that could be hoped for from the election was that all the key players of Congolese society received the share of the vote that gave them roughly the proportion of power they expected. Deviation from this arrangement risked settling the differences through violence. Given the sharp geographic and ethnic differentiation in support within the country, open elections risked further pitting groups against each other.

While donors may not recognise this phenomenon, individual Congolese tell a different story. A shopkeeper named Moise interviewed by Al Jazeera stated “I figured that he [Kabila] wouldn’t leave office, even if he lost the elections. So why bother voting for anybody else?”. In these circumstances, elections merely serve as an opportunity for groups to advance candidates who will serve as siphons for patronage.

In the post conflict world of the DRC, the election failed to confer full legitimacy to any one candidate, but gave each the incentive to challenge for it. Consequently, the election heightened rather than reduced the threat of future violence.

What does the future hold?

It seems unlikely that these elections will lead to a complete fracturing of Congolese society, partly through Kabila’s strong hold on the remaining machinery of government and partly through the war-weariness of the populace. Kabila’s control only extends so far. In North and South Kivus, local leaders continue to enjoy a strong degree of political autonomy. The opposition has also failed to mobilise a strong challenge on the streets and the courts. This combination of factors make Kabila’s government relatively stable, as long as Kabila does not overreach his power.

But Kabila has not come through this process unscathed and neither has the Congo. Kabila has shed another layer of legitimacy from his already fraying position. In the short term and in areas of strong support this may not matter. But within opposition areas and in the peripheries, like the particularly perennial conflict region of the Kivus, Kabila’s declining legitimacy may correspond with a rising tide of localised violence. Rather than broad national-level violence, the problem of endemic local violence may well worsen in the face of declining government legitimacy.

The DRC is a remarkably complex political and social situation and does not lend itself to generalisation. But it seems unlikely that the election will prove to be a hammer blow to Kabila’s government and that Congo will return to the levels of violence it experienced from 1998 – 2003, costing around 5.4 million lives. Yet Kabila’s loss of legitimacy may well lead to a destabilisation of the periphery of the Congo, with profound implications for internal violence levels as well as the security of neighbouring states such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

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