When a government, any government, grapples with a foreign policy problem, there often comes a time when the nature of that problem fundamentally changes. The situation in question may become bigger than was anticipated, the dangers more serious, the methods required more violent, or perhaps just the assessment more realistic. When this happens, that government is faced with a simple choice: decide that the issue is too important to abandon, and increase resources in pursuit of success, but in so doing also increase the costs of failure; or come to the opposite conclusion, that whatever gains might be made are outweighed by the possible losses, and extract one’s country from the foreign policy problem, taking a short term political hit, but ensuring that greater retreats do not happen in future. It is a problem that does not have to be military in character, though often is, and it is the kind of problem that President Obama is grappling with this week as he prepares to make his announcement on future American strategy, and by implication future NATO strategy, in Afghanistan.

This strategy, whatever it may be, has been a long time coming. In one sense, Obama’s careful deliberation is admirable. The approach we saw under President Bush, while perhaps well intentioned, never involved a systematic assessment of what the United States wanted to achieve in Afghanistan and how they would then go about achieving it. That Obama is now making that assessment sensibly and logically is not in doubt; it is an assessment that is long overdue. He has some of the finest military minds in the world to draw upon, men who understand that this no longer the Cold War and that tactical victories and technological advantage simply are not enough in a 21st century ‘war amongst the people’. He has at his side men and women whose desire genuinely to understand the problem and its potential impacts and solutions is greater than has ever previously been the case since 9/11. At his disposal is a military machine that, after years of hard lessons in both Iraq and Afghanistan, is better trained and equipped for counter-insurgency operations than ever before. On paper the signs should be good.

Yet, for all of these, the one thing President Obama lacks is time, and in that sense this delay is highly dangerous. It has been well over two months since General Stanley McChrystal’s report was leaked to the Washington Post. McChrystal’s analysis was stark: begin to fight and build in Afghanistan like it matters, or fail. Muddling through is no longer an option. Yet that is exactly what our troops, America’s troops, and the troops of other NATO nations have done as they have waited on Obama’s decision. More of their number have died, more Afghan civilians have died, and more development projects have stalled, all rapidly eroding the already shrunken political capital of a war that once had overwhelming support in the West. More time without a clear strategy means more political damage, which in turn reduces NATO’s chances of success as its will to fight is worn down. This lack of success leads to yet more political damage in a vicious cycle that can be ended only by a decision. In some sense whatever Obama does on Tuesday will be a step forward - for no report of his deliberations seems to be suggesting that withdrawal, reduction, or indeed maintenance of forces at the current level are options being considered. The question is how big that step will be.

First, it is important to note just how important this war is. The inability of our government and other governments to properly articulate the case for it has without reservation been their biggest failing. In the uncertainty of the post 9/11 world the case for invasion was clear and hardly needs restating here. The war being fought today is a different war, against a different enemy – the post-2002 ‘neo-Taliban’ has both quite different personnel and different practices – but is no less necessary. To allow Afghanistan to fall under Taliban control again is unacceptable. Before 2001the Taliban built links with Al-Qa’ida because the money and resources that Bin Laden brought strengthened Mullah Omar’s grip on the country. In return, Al-Qa’ida had a base from which to run its campaign: a campaign that, lest we forget the US embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and the USS Cole attack of 2000, predates 9/11. Yet today the neo-Taliban is far more international in outlook than it was in its earlier form. To think that such links will not be built again is absurd. They already have been.

The Pakistan dimension is well known: just as the Afghan insurgency draws much of its strength from the Taliban controlled regions of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), so the insurgency in Pakistan could draw much strength from Afghanistan were the Taliban to regain control. Less well known are the links developed in the central Asian republics, notably with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union, which have been responsible for attacks and kidnappings in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and which base themselves out of FATA. Added to this is the threat to the stability of three great powers – India, China and Russia – all of whom are watching with interest and all of whom are doing their own (albeit not very loudly publicised) bit to try and make Afghanistan work. There is significant potential for regional overspill if the Taliban return. At best, that would provide more headaches for the world’s great powers. At worst, new regions from where highly dangerous groups could operate would come into being, and global instability could follow. That doesn’t necessarily mean bombs on tube trains– but as we have seen, it could mean attacks on embassies, military assets and, most dangerously, allies, breeding yet more instability. That cannot be allowed to happen.

Quitting is not an option.

So how should NATO and America stop it? Quitting is not an option. I won’t deny that Joe Biden’s suggestion is tempting. A small increase in forces in the short term combined with a withdrawal of conventional western troops to only the most significant urban centres will ensure critical mass and should improve force protection immeasurably – i.e. fewer body bags. That will be followed ultimately by a major drawdown in numbers. Terrorist elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan could be pursued by special forces and Predator drones operating out of bases that already exist on both sides of the border. In short, the terrorists are pinned back, our troops come home, and the Taliban are treated as what they are – a regional movement. Tempting indeed.

Yet it is not enough, because it is not sustainable. The root problem in Afghanistan is a lack of stability and governance (or at least relative stability, and reasonable governance), and this plan will do nothing to solve that. The Taliban were as successful as they were in the 1990s in part because they brought some measure of each, however violent and brutish in form, to a country that was tired of the warlords, rape and banditry that characterised it in the post-Soviet era. By effectively ceding the countryside and many urban centres to the Taliban (for, certainly as things look at the moment, Afghan security forces will not be able to hold these areas themselves, though given time the indications are that with greater numbers and improving quality, particularly of the Afghan National Army, this situation will change), the US and NATO would be giving up on building governance in key parts of Afghanistan. It is easy to forget just how important the countryside is: only 24% of Afghans live in urban areas; in Britain the figure is 90%. Once the West loses interest again, as it will, the Afghan state will not be strong enough to survive on its own feet as a result. Instability will duly follow, and Afghanistan will return to haunt us.

So it’s time to double. The US needs to substantially increase forces in Afghanistan, as does NATO more generally. At least 30,000 extra troops (reported to be Obama’s second largest option, with the largest being 40,000) would provide the manpower to stabilise key urban centres and some of the ‘bubbles’ that exist at the moment around such centres. This needs to be coupled with a comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign, a war amongst the people – engaging in local politics; talking to Afghans to find out what they want in terms of development, and producing it; protecting Afghans from the Taliban, and giving them confidence that the West is not about to turn and run; training and equipping Afghans in large numbers to protect themselves, whether in the form of the Afghan National Army or local security militias; and most importantly, making sure that the Afghan government gets as much of the credit for all of this as possible. If the people of Afghanistan, divided enough as they are already, continue to lack faith in the Kabul government then they will also continue to hedge their bets due to a belief that the Taliban will be back in power eventually.

It can work, and in parts of Afghanistan where resources exist it already is: in Garmsir, for example, the US Marines have undertaken a classic ‘Clear-Hold-Build’ strategy, allowing normality to return to the town, creating space for development to take place, and bringing relative stability – all with Afghan security forces providing the face of the strategy in the town itself. McChrystal is right. If Garmsir is to become the rule rather than the exception then there must be more development resources, and more troops, Western and Afghan, to clear the space for those resources to be put to use. We should not be deluded: despite the plan being a good one, it may not work. This is in many ways year one from a counter-insurgency perspective; from a political perspective the US and her allies have been in Afghanistan for eight years and patience is wearing thin. If results are not swift the political pressure will become unbearable, even if success on the ground is attainable. Yet too much is riding on this to leave now. Victory is still possible – as long as one doesn’t define ‘victory’ as a Jeffersonian democracy and pacific calm. We must be realistic in our goals. Yet if they are ever to be achieved the US and NATO must begin to fight for those goals without one hand behind their back. Ultimately, that is what will bring Western troops home - and keep them home.